Symmetry and the Metaphysics of Physics by Baker, David John
Symmetry and the Metaphysics of Physics
David John Baker*
University of Michigan
Abstract
The widely held picture of dynamical symmetry as surplus structure in a physical theory has many
metaphysical applications. Here, I focus on its relevance to the question of which quantities in a
theory represent fundamental natural properties.
1. Introduction
The proper role of physics as evidence for metaphysicians is the subject of much dispute
(see, e.g., Maudlin 2007; Ladyman and Ross 2007). But there is one topic in metaphysics
on which almost all will agree that physics is most qualified to comment. We commonly
think of our universe as made up (at least partly) of some fundamental natural properties,
quantities which each take on one of a range of physically possible values. Typical exam-
ples include mass, position, energy, and electric charge, though it may be that these will
be replaced as fundamental quantities by something like the amplitude of the quantum
wavefunction or the configuration of superstrings. Although this conception of the world
as made up of natural quantities has been challenged, most famously by Goodman, it
remains an important part of most accepted systems of metaphysics.
It is therefore a very good question, according to these systems, what the fundamental
natural quantities actually are, and perhaps also what they might be in other physically
possible worlds. And it is normally thought that fundamental physics provides our best
means of answering this question.
This means it is of paramount importance, metaphysically, to develop a method for
extracting from a physical theory a description of the fundamental quantities according to
that theory. One promising method, which has received significant attention in the phi-
losophy of physics literature, appeals to the concept of symmetry. My threefold goal here
is to introduce this method, provide a prima facie argument in its favor, and discuss some
cases in which it seems to work rather well.1
The first step will be to make clear what symmetry signifies in physics. The word is
used in a few different ways, but I’ll be concerned here with dynamical symmetries. This
concept admits an intuitive as well as a formal definition; the intuitive definition is: sym-
metries of a theory are transformations that preserve its laws.
We have a rough sense of what it means for a transformation to preserve an object –
that is, map it to itself. A square with four identical corners and four identical sides is
preserved in this way by 90 rotations, but not by 45 rotations, which map it to a
diamond instead of an identical square. We say that the 90 rotations leave the square
invariant by mapping it to a qualitatively identical geometric object. In a similar way,
transformations like real-world rotations can leave the laws of physics invariant. Newton’s
theory accurately predicts how long it will take my pencil to fall if I let go of it, and
these predictions are preserved even if the pencil and myself are both rotated by some
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angle in space. Since all the predictions of Newtonian mechanics are preserved in this
way by rotations, the group of all rotations is a symmetry of Newtonian physics.2
The formal definition requires a bit of mathematical machinery. Complete physical
theories like Newtonian mechanics, relativity, and quantum mechanics can be formulated
in a mathematical arena called a state space. We use that name because every element in
state space stands for a physically possible (instantaneous) state of the world according to
our theory. The experimental information we get from a theory comes in the form of
predictions about how states will change over time. We call this account of temporal
change a theory’s dynamics; mathematically, the dynamics is sometimes represented by
time-indexed transformations U(t¢) on state space that takes a state at time t ¼ 0 to the
state it will change into at time t¢. So a theory’s dynamics is a mapping from states to
states. Transformations like rotations are also given by mappings T from states to states.
Symmetries are then given by transformations that leave the dynamics (diachronic laws)
unchanged. Mathematically, this means they must commute with the dynamics, so that
U(t¢)T ¼ TU(t¢) for every symmetry transformation T and every time t¢. It will turn out
that transformations like these meet our intuitive condition of leaving the laws invariant.3
With the concept of symmetry in hand, we now move on to the question of why
these transformations should have any systematic metaphysical importance. In short, it
will turn out that states related by symmetries must share identical values of all fundamen-
tal quantities.
2. Using Symmetry to Find Fundamental Quantities
What features distinguish fundamental quantities from non-fundamental ones? Most
importantly, fundamental quantities are supposed to ground or explain objective similarity
between objects and states of affairs, in a way that non-fundamental properties cannot.
For example, two electrons are objectively similar because they are both negatively
charged (and thus agree on a fundamental quantity), but not because they are both men-
tioned in this article.
The relation of similarity grounded by fundamental quantities on this picture is sup-
posed to be objective – it’s up to Nature, not us, to determine which things are qualita-
tively similar. One plausible necessary condition for objectivity is invariance under
descriptive changes. The relation of similarity between objects shouldn’t change depend-
ing on which language, coordinate system, etc. I use to describe them.
A coordinate system (at least in familiar Euclidean geometry) is a piece of surplus struc-
ture. It’s something extra we add to the theory to aid us in describing coordinate-inde-
pendent facts. It has been suggested, for example, by Belot (2001), that physical quantities
which vary under symmetry transformations are like coordinate systems in this way. In
other words, the symmetries of a physical theory are a guide to surplus structure in the
theory’s formalism. If this is correct, and if changes in surplus structure are generally (as
in geometry) mere descriptive changes, it follows that physical situations related by sym-
metries must be qualitatively identical. And if this is right, then physical quantities that
change under symmetry transformations (i.e., that are not invariant) must not be funda-
mental quantities. Qualitatively identical objects or worlds cannot disagree about the fun-
damental quantities.
Why believe that symmetry transformations change only surplus structure? This ques-
tion is somewhat murky, and my answer will signify a good place for those who disagree
with my approach to get off the boat. It’s an answer I find compelling nonetheless. It
rests on the notion that the language of fundamental physics is complete in a particular
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sense: in a satisfactory physical theory, the fundamental quantities are all dynamical differ-
ence-makers. Difference-makers, that is, in the sense that differences in the fundamental
quantities must make some difference in how the state of a (physically possible) world
evolves in time.
It would be bizarre if by fixing the values of all fundamental quantities, we could not
thereby fix (if not deterministically, at least probabilistically) how a physical world will
evolve in time. In my view, the converse seems equally plausible: if objects (or worlds)
are fundamentally different, fundamental physics should recognize and explain that fact.
A theory in which some fundamental quantities are completely epiphenomenal is, for that
reason, an unsatisfactory theory. A quantity is epiphenomenal, I take it, if it can be left
out of a complete dynamical explanation of the world’s evolution in time. It follows that
quantities with no bearing on the evolution of the world’s physical state must not be fun-
damental. Dynamical explanations can make do without these quantities, so their claim to
fundamentality is suspect.
The present approach may also be bolstered by an epistemological argument of the sort
offered by Healey (2006). Without addressing the metaphysical question of whether pos-
sibilities related by symmetries could differ qualitatively, Healey argues that it is never jus-
tifiable to accept a theory according to which they do differ. He bases this on a
preference for theories which are ‘uniquely realized’, which means that all of their theo-
retical terms can be defined using the method proposed by Lewis (1970). Theories which
are not uniquely realized (‘multiply realized’ theories) require that we use demonstrations
if we want to name theoretical entities or properties with indistinguishable roles in the
theory. For example, if water and twater are distinct substances with indistinguishable
roles in our theory, we will have to name them by pointing at particular pools of liquid,
rather than defining one (per Lewis’s method) as the unique realizer of the water role
and the other as the unique realizer of the twater role.
Lewis (1970: 146) claims that ‘A uniquely realized theory is, other things being equal,
certainly more satisfactory than a multiply realized theory’, and Healey adamantly agrees.
When it is possible to formulate a theory with terms whose reference is uniquely fixed
by their role in that theory, Healey thinks we should do so. To do otherwise would be
to flout Ockham’s dictum to seek out simpler theories; more importantly for Healey, it
would be to turn against the scientific realist tenet that the explanatory power of a theory
is what gives us reason to believe in its truth. A multiply realized theory is unsatisfactory
because it includes ‘elements purporting to represent real structures but that play no role
in contributing to the theory’s success’, since nothing about the theory’s success hinges
on how these elements of the theory are defined. To describe the world using a multiply
realized theory requires that we define its theoretical terms arbitrarily, in such a way that
at least one other definition would do just as well.
By treating possibilities related by symmetries as fundamentally identical, this arbitrari-
ness can be avoided. In this case, every fundamental quantity will possess a unique theo-
retical role – otherwise it would be related by a symmetry to any other quantities with
identical roles. So the present approach can ensure that any theory of the qualitative facts
is uniquely realized – and thus epistemically preferable to the alternatives, by Healey’s
lights.
Other arguments to this same conclusion, that qualitative features are invariant under
symmetries, have also been advanced. Roberts (2008) provides a convincing argument
(really an explanation of a well-known fact) that measurable quantities must be invariant.
So if one holds to a modest verificationism according to which qualitative features of
the world must be measurable in principle, the conclusion about symmetries follows.
Symmetry and Metaphysics 1159
ª 2010 The Author Philosophy Compass 5/12 (2010): 1157–1166, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00361.x
Philosophy Compass ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
A similar point is made by Ismael and van Fraassen (2003), who explicitly endorse such
verificationism. I don’t necessarily agree with this premise myself, but those who do
should embrace my approach to symmetries.
3. Spacetime Symmetries: Leibniz Equivalence
The most straightforward – and fruitful – consequences of my preferred approach to sym-
metries can be found in the interpretation of spacetime theories. A symmetry-based
understanding of these theories allows us to separate the question of whether space (or
spacetime) exists from related questions about the modal features of its parts (points and
regions). One of Leibniz’s most important theses about Newtonian mechanics is really a
claim about the modal properties of points, and it can be defended decisively if we treat
the symmetries of mechanics as surplus structure. This thesis of Leibniz equivalence can
be formulated analogously in relativistic theories of spacetime, and remains plausible there
for the same reasons.
A major point of contention between Leibniz and Clarke was the possibility of certain
counterfactual arrangements of matter in space. Clarke held that all of the spatial relations
between material objects might have been just as they actually are, but the positions of
these objects shifted uniformly with respect to space itself. We all might have been
located a foot to the left of where we actually are, and everything else been the same.
Leibniz denied this possibility.
Leibniz defends his view by appeal to the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). In an
important paper, Belot (2001) shows that the same work can be done by a somewhat
revisionary version of PSR that treats qualitatively indiscernible worlds as identical.
Belot’s PSR can always be defended against purported counterexamples, he claims, if we
insist (as in the present approach) that symmetries reveal surplus structure.
In applying his PSR to Newtonian mechanics, Belot presents an important mathemati-
cal structure that can be constructed for any physical system with symmetries: the reduced
state space. Recall that we defined a symmetry as a mapping on state space (the space of
‘physically possible worlds’ of a theory). The reduced state space is the space of equiva-
lence classes of worlds related by symmetries. In other words, it is exactly the structure
we get if we identify worlds related by symmetry transformations – qualitatively identical
worlds, on the present approach.
How does this work in Newtonian mechanics? As Belot explains, the state space
Newton used for his mechanics of N particles is 6N-dimensional: there are six degrees of
freedom for each particle, including its position and momentum in each of three dimen-
sions in physical space. (Note that in this case each degree of freedom corresponds to a
fundamental quantity.) This state space includes many qualitatively identical states related
to each other by global translations or rotations of all the matter in space, or by global
increases in the velocity of all matter (which we call Galileian boosts). The set of all these
transformations taken together is the Galileian group, the symmetry group of Newtonian
mechanics.
In constructing the reduced space of the Newtonian state space by identifying states
related by Galileian symmetry transformations, we effectively reduce the theory’s degrees
of freedom. For example, there are distinct states in Newton’s state space that differ only
by the position (in absolute space) of the universe’s center of mass. All these states are
treated as a single state in the reduced space. As a result, three degrees of freedom – the
ones needed to specify the position of the center of mass – are left out of the reduced
space. In total, ten degrees of freedom can be eliminated in this way, corresponding to
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the position and linear motion of the center of mass and the rotational motion of the
universe as a whole.
Thus, while Newton believed his N-particle mechanics required 6N fundamental
quantities, 6N ) 10 will do perfectly well. This revision will in turn require a picture of
space and time according to which quantities like the position and linear motion of the
universe’s center of mass are not needed to give a full description of a physical possibility.
That sort of picture is provided by so-called Galileian spacetime, in which acceleration,
but not position or velocity, is absolute.4 In this way, the present approach to symmetry
points toward a superior picture of space and time compatible with the success of New-
ton’s theory. The key was to identify states that are related by spacetime symmetries as
the same physical possibility. The inference from spacetime symmetry to physical equiva-
lence has sometimes been called ‘Leibniz equivalence’, after his early arguments to similar
conclusions.
The present approach can be applied similarly, and even more successfully, to our most
advanced spacetime theory: general relativity (GR). Unlike previous spacetime theories,
GR doesn’t occur against the fixed background of a single spacetime. Instead, many dis-
tinct spacetimes (with distinct symmetries) are solutions of the same theory. The symme-
tries of these individual spacetime solutions often provide interesting (although physically
contingent) information. But the interesting symmetries for purposes of the present
approach are the symmetries of GR as a whole: diffeomorphisms.
A diffeomorphism is simply a differentiable map taking all points in a spacetime to all
points in another (or the same) spacetime. In effect, a diffeomorphism is a re-labeling or
re-assignment of spacetime points which leaves unchanged spacetime’s matter content
and its metric structure (distance relations). For example, a diffeomorphism must leave
unchanged the distance between massive objects, but may alter which spacetime points
those objects occupy – in doing so it also alters the distance relations between the points.
On the present approach to symmetries, a physical spacetime should be given by a diffeo-
morphism equivalence class of mathematical spacetimes. The diffeomorphism symmetry
of GR thus tells us that it makes no physical difference which points occupy which phys-
ical roles, so long as the same physical roles and relations are instantiated.
What would it be like for the assignment of physical roles to points to be of metaphys-
ical significance? This would require, at a minimum, the existence of primitive facts
about the trans-world identity of points. For, if diffeomorphisms can relate different possi-
bilities, it must be possible for spacetime points to have their qualitative features reversed
(or at least for two different points to have the same qualitative features in two different
worlds). This might require a sort of haecceitism about spacetime points; at least it
requires the existence of apparently haecceitistic facts about points. It is natural, on the
present approach, to reject the possibility of such facts, since the symmetry of GR tells us
that they do no work in physical explanations. The principle of Leibniz equivalence thus
extends straightforwardly to GR.
What’s more, it permits the interpreter of GR to dodge an important problem the the-
ory raises for naive forms of substantivalism. This is the ‘hole argument’ (see Earman and
Norton 1987). If one does assume, contrary to the present approach, that there are dis-
tinct physical possibilities related by diffeomorphisms, a strange sort of unobservable inde-
terminism pops up in GR. This is because a diffeomorphism can sometimes leave a
particular surface of simultaneity (a state of the world ‘at a time’) unchanged while shuf-
fling around what happens at which point in the future of that surface. Since the shuffling
changes nothing invariant under GR’s symmetries, the indeterminism disappears on the
present approach, where only such invariants are physically real (Hoefer 1996).
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Besides being unobservable, the hole-argument indeterminism is spooky in that it offers
no probabilistic predictions about what will happen at which point. It simply entails that
many diffeomorphism-related solutions (which the believer in Leibniz equivalence would
count as physically the same) are possible, without assigning likelihoods to any of them.
If this sort of chanceless, unobservable indeterminism strikes us (as I think it should) as a
theoretical problem for GR naively interpreted, the present approach to symmetries pro-
vides a solution.
Some foundational confusion arises, however, in applying the present approach to nar-
row down the fundamental physical quantities in GR. A natural requirement would seem
to be that the fundamental quantities remain constant along ‘gauge orbits’, curves in state
space that connect states related by diffeomorphisms. Quantities failing to meet this con-
dition would appear to be altered by symmetry transformations. But as Earman (2002)
argues, the list of quantities meeting this condition is very small, and includes no quanti-
ties that take on different values at different times. Does this mean there is never temporal
change in any of GR’s fundamental quantities?
As Maudlin (2002) argues, this is an absurd result, since changing quantities like the
position of Mercury are the source of our evidence for GR in the first place. So Earman’s
argument must be an antinomy of sorts. Maudlin argues that this indicates a flaw in the
present approach to symmetries, but an alternative (although closely related) diagnosis by
Healey (2004) allows us to preserve the present approach while rejecting Earman’s con-
clusion. As Healey points out, Earman’s assumptions about what counts as invariant under
the diffeomorphism symmetry of GR don’t hold up when the lesson of Leibniz equiva-
lence is taken into account. A paradigm example of an observable quantity in GR is the
scalar curvature of spacetime, R(x). This quantity changes along a gauge orbit because the
mathematical point x used to stand for a point p in physical spacetime can be altered by a
diffeomorphism. So while R’s value at p is left unchanged by the transformation, the for-
malism tells us (misleadingly) that since R(x) is not unchanged, neither is the scalar curva-
ture. This is the misstep in Earman’s antinomy.
The present approach to symmetry has acquitted itself admirably in the philosophy of
space and time. It leads us to sensible and informative metaphysical conclusions while
avoiding the troubling implications of Earman’s antinomy and the hole argument’s inde-
terminism. Moving on to other symmetries besides those of spacetime, we will find simi-
lar successes.
4. Global Internal Symmetries and Humeanism
The symmetry transformations we just discussed act on a system by taking some spatio-
temporal distribution of physical structures and rearranging it into a different distribution
of the same physical structures. There are also symmetries which involve only changes in
the values of the physical quantities. Since these transformations alter the value of the
quantities that constitute a physical structure, rather than changing anything spatially or
temporally external to it, we call them ‘internal symmetries’.
The most familiar example arises in introductory electrostatics. The electrostatic poten-
tial V(x) (measured in the unit of volts) is a quantity whose gradient at a point x deter-
mines the electric field, and therefore the force, at x. Since adding a constant to V(x)
(transforming V(x) fi V(x) + c) does not change its gradient, such a transformation
makes no difference to the electrostatic force, and therefore no difference to the motion
of charged particles. So any such transformation leaves the dynamical law (Coulomb’s
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law) unchanged, and is therefore a symmetry. We call it a ‘global’ internal symmetry,
since the transformation acts identically on the value of V at every point (i.e., globally).
In another important example, the wavefunction w(x) which describes a system of par-
ticles in quantum mechanics is symmetric under a group of internal transformations called
phase transformations. w(x) is a complex-valued function on the 3N-dimensional space of
possible configurations for N particles. The likelihood of the particles’ locations falling
within a region R of this space on measurement is given by the integral of |w|2 over this
region. The square of a complex number is left unchanged if we multiply it by another
complex number of absolute value one. The complex numbers of absolute value one,
each of form eih; h 2 R form a group called U(1). Multiplying w(x) at every point by
the same element of U(1) gives a phase transformation, which leaves all probabilities (and
relative phases) unchanged and is therefore a symmetry of quantum mechanics.
Global internal symmetries of this sort present a challenge to a Humean combinatorial
metaphysics where the fundamental quantities are point-sized.5 This challenge arises in
cases where the symmetry transformations alter the numerical values of the fundamental
point-sized quantities – which should lead us to expect that the representation of these
quantities contains some surplus structure. In some cases (the quantum wavefunction is
one such) the surplus structure appears to include the representation of the quantities as
localized at points. After ‘modding out’ the surplus, we are left with quantities less local
or point-sized than the ones we started with. Let’s look at the quantum example.
There are excellent reasons to be unsatisfied with a picture of quantum mechanics as
describing only probabilities for particles to show up somewhere when measured. What
counts as a measurement when all aspects of the world are presumably quantum? This is
the aptly-named measurement problem. One possible route to a solution is to suppose
that w(x) is a physical field on configuration space (see Albert 1996).
This step in solving the measurement problem runs directly afoul of the present
approach to symmetries. The complex value of w(x) is altered by phase transformations,
which are symmetries of quantum theory. So therefore it cannot stand for a fundamental
physical quantity, but must instead represent surplus structure.
w(x) can’t be entirely surplus structure, since the values it takes at points fully deter-
mine a physical state and physical states must contain some qualitative information. So it
must be that the wavefunction consists partly of real physical information, and partly of
surplus structure. One way to get rid of the surplus is to suppose that |w(x)|2 is physi-
cally fundamental, and the breakdown of w into real and imaginary components is sur-
plus. Unfortunately, as Wallace (forthcoming: 52) points out, this leaves out information
about the relative phases of w’s components, which is of empirical import, since it deter-
mines the degree of interference between these components.
Alternative candidates for fundamental quantities are given by other phase-invariant
quantities we can define in terms of w(x). One such is the density operator |wæÆw|, an
operator on Hilbert space which contains all of the information about the state included
in the wavefunction. In a quantum theory defined on spacetime, like quantum field the-
ory, one can also construct a ‘local’ density operator describing the state’s behavior in any
region of spacetime. Wallace and Timpson (forthcoming) have advanced an attractive
view they call ‘spacetime state realism’, according to which the density operators assigned
to regions stand for the fundamental quantities.
Due to the existence of entangled states, which exhibit instantaneous correlations
between distant parts of a physical system, the density operators which are fundamental
in spacetime state realism do not conform to Humean combinatorial metaphysics. The
density operator of the region made up of regions A and B (their union) is not uniquely
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determined by the operators assigned to A and B. In this way, a ‘spacetime state’ universe
is not built up of localized parts that fully determine its large-scale features. Spacetime state
realism, favored by the present approach over the alternative wavefunction realist view,
differs from that view in part by denying what Lewis called Humean supervenience.
There may be alternative Humean ontologies for quantum theory which do respect
phase symmetry. For instance, Tumulka (2009) has proposed an ontology of instantaneous
point-sized ‘flashes’ which are obviously invariant. But Tumulka’s ontology has so far
been applied to only a few toy quantum theories, whereas spacetime state realism applies
to all of them (since it uses only the pre-existing quantum formalism).
5. Gauge Potentials and Aharonov–Bohm
When I transform the phase of a wavefunction w(x), I do so by multiplying it by the
same unit complex number at all points x. It is also possible for a similar theory to be
symmetric under internal transformations that differ from point to point (and even time
to time). This more complex type of symmetry is called a ‘local’ internal symmetry, or
local gauge symmetry. Theories exhibiting it are called ‘gauge theories’.
Such theories make additional trouble for the Humean, if we hold to the present
approach. They also provide a case (like that of general relativity) in which the present
approach dodges serious problems of interpretation having to do with determinism. For in
gauge theories, ontologies which eschew the present approach to preserve a metaphysics of
Humean point-sized quantities face the problem of chanceless, unobservable indeterminism.
Although they may sound exotic, gauge theories are everywhere. The best-known
example is classical electrodynamics. In relativistic electrodynamics, the vector potential
Ai(x) is an often-used quantity. As a relativistic invariant, it is a four-dimensional vector;
the time component is the familiar electric potential V(x) (discussed above) while the space
components collectively form the magnetic potential. Since the value of V(x) is physically
unimportant, we would expect the same to be true of Ai(x)’s components, and indeed that
is correct. Physical predictions are fixed by the field tensor Fij(x) ¼ ¶iAj(x) ) ¶jAi(x). This
quantity is left unchanged if we add the gradient of a scalar field to Ai(x), transforming
Ai(x) fi Ai(x) + ¶iK(x). These are called (local) gauge transformations – local since they
take on different values at different points x. Adding a gauge transformation to a vector
potential solution of Maxwell’s equations always gives us another solution.
Nothing prevents K(x) from taking on non-zero values in some parts of spacetime but
not others. In particular, in a given frame K(x) might be zero prior to t and non-zero
after t. This means that two solutions to Maxwell’s equations – two possibilities, accord-
ing to electrodynamics – can agree completely about the potential up until t while dis-
agreeing about its values thereafter. On any reasonable definition of determinism, this
means that Ai(x) does not evolve deterministically – its evolution is not even predicted
probabilistically. It is therefore a very poor choice of fundamental quantity for electro-
magnetism, which is normally taken to be deterministic and whose observables evolve
deterministically (except in certain strange cases).
Cast in the extremely general ‘fiber bundle’ formalism, this indeterminism is analogous
to the ‘hole problem’ in general relativity we discussed earlier (see Healey 2007). The
solution ought to be similar, that is, a choice of potential should be similar to a choice of
co-ordinates, a conventional way of speaking about fundamental reality. One easy way to
get this result is just to stipulate that the field tensor Fij(x) is fundamental. (Since this
quantity isn’t changed by gauge transformations, we call it ‘gauge invariant’.) But such a
posit is undermined by a phenomenon called the Aharonov–Bohm effect.
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In an Aharonov–Bohm experiment, a current is sent through a long (represented as
infinite) solenoid, or coiled electromagnet. The field Fij(x) remains zero outside the sole-
noid, but the phase of complex waves passing by the solenoid is nonetheless altered.
Since the wavefunction w(x) of a quantum particle is a complex wave, and since its dif-
ferences in phase from other particles’ wavefunctions is observable, this leads to a measur-
able difference in the behavior of quantum particles passing by solenoids despite the zero
field in their vicinity. If electromagnetic fields are the explanation for this behavior, they
must act on quantum particles at a distance – not a very elegant picture.
There are other gauge-invariant ontologies that can explain Aharonov–Bohm without
action at a distance, but as with spacetime state realism they are incompatible with a
Humean metaphysics. On one view, the fundamental quantities are so-called ‘holono-
mies’, which are defined not at points but instead on closed loops in spacetime (Healey
2007). Obviously these are not local quantities in the sense preferred by Humean super-
venience. On another view, the fundamental quantities are gauge-invariant values of the
so-called ‘connection’, which are (in Maudlin’s parlance) ‘hyper-local’, so that there is no
determinate matter of fact about whether distant spacetime points agree as to their value
(Maudlin 2007: 78–103). Either way the present approach to symmetries, combined with
the reasonable physicist’s bias against discontinuous action at a distance, dictates a surpris-
ingly revisionist ontology – but one that preserves determinism against the specter of
spooky unobservable indeterminism.
6. Further Questions
Considerations of space prevent me from posing, let alone addressing, all the interesting
problems in this area. To what extent do symmetries dictate the nature of forces? (Martin
2002). How can they have empirical import? (Healey 2009). Is the group a general
enough concept to represent all symmetries? (Guay and Hepburn 2009). I leave the pur-
suit of these problems to the interested reader.
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1 The method I present here is one of many proposals, and it is perhaps less nuanced than most. I see its simplicity
as a virtue, but many others would call it oversimplified. For an opposing view of symmetries, see Maudlin (2002:
1–7).
2 By ‘group’ I mean something more interesting than a family or set. A group G is a set with a distinguished ‘iden-
tity’ element e and a ‘product’ (two-place function) (Æ) such that e Æ g ¼ g for all g 2 G and every g 2 G has an
‘inverse’ g)1 such that g)1 Æ g ¼ e. The set of all rotations in three-dimensional space clearly form a group (called
SO(3)) if we define the product of two rotations as the result of performing one rotation and then the other.
3 Time-indexed dynamical transformations of this sort are not always well-defined. In general, this article will fol-
low most of the literature in ignoring and oversimplifying a very deep problem: given a physical theory, how do
we determine its symmetries? See Belot (in progress) for a sophisticated look at these problems.
4 As Belot points out, we can even do without absolute acceleration if we count global variables for the total angu-
lar momentum of the universe as fundamental quantities – although this further parsimony is not entailed by the
present approach to symmetry.
5 According to such a view (e.g., David Lewis’s ‘Humean supervenience’), all features of worlds like the one we
live in supervene on the distribution of fundamental properties over points in spacetime.
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